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DATE: JUL 2000

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Evans, State (INF)  
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (DIA)  
Colonel J. C. Jeffries, Jr., USA (ACSI)  
Captain G. K. Nicodemus, USN (ONI)  
Colonel W. M. Hargett, USAF (AFCEI 2B2)  
Colonel G. R. Ronka, USAF, Chief Designate,  
Policy Staff, NSA

SUBJECT: SNIE 13-6-62: IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNIST  
CHINA'S ACQUISITION OF A  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

1. The attached terms of reference have been prepared to meet specific planning requirements of the Department of State. We recognize that most of these requirements might be met through NIE 4-2-62, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation," already scheduled for completion later this quarter. However, we envisage that paper as a fairly general paper which, after updating previous Nth country estimates on the technical and economic capabilities of additional countries to develop nuclear capabilities, assessed the impact of likely French and Communist Chinese progress and other developments on the nuclear proliferation problem across the board. Given the urgency and specific nature of State's questions, including the emphasis on implications for Communist China itself, we believe it would be best to handle them in the presently proposed special estimate. This paper, along with the forthcoming estimate (NIE 22-62) on the French nuclear program could then be used as one of the inputs to the more general estimate on nuclear proliferation.

2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1000, Friday, 12 October in Room 7E62 Langley building to discuss these terms. We would hope to have contributions by the end of October, with a view to completing USIB action by, say, 5 December.

  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

DISTRIBUTION B  
Plus, Chmn, GMAIC, JAEIC, SIC

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GROUP 1

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grading and declassification.

in 2/62  
NWDD 981022-74

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 October 1962

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SNIE 13-6-62: IMPLICATIONS OF  
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ACQUISITION OF  
A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

## THE PROBLEM

To assess Communist China's progress toward acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability and to estimate certain implications of this development.

## QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

## I. COMMUNIST CHINA'S PROSPECTS OF ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

(Contributors are requested to up-date their contributions to NIE 13-2-62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities," dated 25 April 1962.)

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- A. Review any recent evidence bearing on China's nuclear weapons program. Are there any developments which could drastically accelerate or retard this program?
- B. When is Communist China likely to explode a nuclear device? How soon thereafter can it acquire a significant nuclear weapons capability? Estimate the probable timing of successive phases of the weapons program. What aircraft or missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons are likely to be available to the Chinese over the next decade?

## II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

### A. Military

1. How might Communist China's military philosophy be affected by the detonation of a nuclear device? By acquisition of a significant nuclear weapons capability?
2. To what extent and in what manner would the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability affect Communist

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China's military capabilities as a power in Asia  
and the Western Pacific?

B. Political and Psychological

1. What would be the probable effect of (a) the detonation of a nuclear device and (b) the acquisition of a significant nuclear weapons capability by the Chinese Communists upon:
  - a. Domestic policy?
  - b. Economic priorities?
  - c. Attitudes of the Chinese people toward the regime?

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. Communist China's Foreign Policies in Asia

1. Foreign policy outlook. In general, would Peiping's leaders become more sober, or more adventurous with respect to acceptance of foreign policy risk? In what ways would the Chinese seek to exploit the new situation?

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2. Foreign policy in practice. In particular, what policy changes would China adopt with respect to India, Japan, and the countries of southeast Asia?

B. Impact of China's Detonation of a Nuclear Device

1. Reactions in Asia. How would the Asian Governments alter their policies toward Peiping? How would these governments alter their attitudes toward the US, especially US base rights?
2. Sino-Soviet relations. Communist China's position in the world Communist movement.
3. Communist China's world position.

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF

ROUTING SHEET

OSD/ISA

*reliability of estimate  
re training*

DATE: 10/10  
LOG NO: I-20502/6

Adm Lee Director  
Janic \_\_\_\_\_  
Connie \_\_\_\_\_

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CHECK ONE:

ACTION: PR (SUSPENSE DATE) 10/17

INFORMATION: Handled informally at 10/12 meeting of

CONCURRENCE: Project I (J) Study Group.

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REMARKS: H. W. Ford of CIA states sanitized version could readily be prepared + he will include some material on the sources + reliability of the estimate, as in the April one. ORIGINATOR: [Signature]  
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